Full report: Iran rejects Trump’s demand for unconditional surrender as a ‘dream’
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This maneuver does handle many of the cases that are standardly described as exhibiting the transferred intent fiction, but it distorts the moral gist of the doctrine. A simple modification to Prosser’s case will illustrate. Suppose a defendant is planning to murder A and that he makes laborious preparation to dispose of her body after the crime. The defendant ardently desires not to kill any bystanders, however, for he has not made any such preparations with respect to them, and inadvertently killing a bystander would threaten to expose his wrongdoing. Hence the defendant diligently examines the plot of land where he plans to kill A, so as to make sure that no one else is on the scene. In an exceptionally improbable turn of events, it turns out that some other person, B, has been buried alive, by a different villain, beneath that very plot of land. The police are on their way to dig out B (and thereby save him from impending asphyxiation). But before the police can arrive, the defendant shoots at A; the bullet misses A but goes into the land beneath him and pierces B’s heart, killing her. Here the risk that shooting at A might cause harm to anyone else, such as B, is so exceptionally small as to foreclose the conclusion that B was a foreseeable victim; the defendant cannot be plausibly accused of negligence toward anyone other than A. All the same, B’s estate appears to have a forceful moral claim to redress.